Voters Choose Managed Democracy Over Constitutional Rule

Americans increasingly prefer guided governance by judges and bureaucrats to the uncertainties of self-rule, according to new evidence from recent elections and historical patterns. The trend reveals a widespread willingness to trade constitutional accountability for managerial control when systems deliver tangible benefits or protect symbolic preferences.

In the recently argued Trump v. Slaughter case, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled what many consider self-evident: Presidents retain constitutional authority under Article II to dismiss federal employees in executive agencies as they see fit. This reality has fueled warnings from a vocal minority on the court—including Justices Ketanji Brown Jackson and Sonia Sotomayor—who argue that presidential oversight would “unleash political chaos.” Jackson specifically cautioned that Trump could “fire all the scientists, the doctors, the economists, and PhDs,” while Sotomayor claimed administrations risk “destroying the structure of government.”

David Harsanyi’s concept of “fourth-branch blues” captures this tension: modern administrative power now rivals constitutional branches in scope. Yet defenders of current systems frame presidential oversight as a threat to democracy, echoing Democratic concerns after Dobbs. The data suggests voters reject such warnings. Recent elections show little appetite for reclaiming authority from courts or bureaucracies—instead prioritizing government benefits and symbolic rights over the burdens of republican self-rule.

Abortion policy exemplifies this shift. When the Roberts Court overturned Roe v. Wade, many Americans responded with fury, enacting restrictive state laws and boosting Democratic turnout. The electorate did not welcome responsibility; it resented it. History repeats itself: In 1811, Spaniards rejected French-imposed liberalism, declaring “abajo el liberalismo” (down with liberalism). Today, at least half of American voters appear similarly disposed—preferring decisions by administrators over constitutional uncertainty.

Paul Gottfried, editor of Chronicles, argues this pattern extends decades. In his 1999 work After Liberalism, he noted that democracy’s expansion coincided with more centralized governance. As shared traditions faded, authority shifted toward expert administration—fueled by an administrative state that frames itself as the “custodian of a science of government.” Justice Jackson’s warnings reflect this assumption: administrators are perceived as morally and intellectually superior to the public.

The preference for managed democracy signals deep unease with constitutional self-governance. For those who value institutional integrity, this trend demands urgent attention.